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A Constitutional Right to Safe Foster
Care? - Time For The Supreme Court
To Pay Its I.O.U.
Daniel L. Skoler*
I. INTRODUCTION
In 1989, in the widely publicized case of DeShaney v. Winnebago
County Department of Social Services,1 the United States Supreme
Court held that a state child welfare agency and its workers had no
affirmative duty under the fourteenth amendment's due process
clause2 to protect a child against life threatening violence by a natu-
ral parent. The court made that determination, hardly unusual in it-
self, even though the state took the child into temporary custody on a
previous abuse complaint, continued to receive warnings and reports
of possible continuing abuse after return to the parental home, was
aware of the danger of further harm to the youngster, and took no
action to remove the child from the parent's custody or otherwise
protect the youngster from the heartbreaking injury that resulted in
irreversible brain damage.
The Court was not indifferent to the horror story inherent in the
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1. 489 U.S. 189 (1989).
2. "No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges
and immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State deprive any person
of life, liberty, or property without due process of law .. " U.S. CONST. amend. XIV,
§ 2.
DeShaney case,3 nor did it minimize the seriousness of the state's
omissions,4 even suggesting that a cause of action under state tort law
might be available to the aggrieved child.5 In the final paragraph of
the majority opinion the Court suggested that Wisconsin might con-
sider a "system of liability" covering state neglect or inaction in such
circumstances.6 The Court made clear, however, that no due process
duty existed to provide protection from an abusing parent nor was
such a duty owed to a child in that natural parent's custody,7 regard-
less of the fact that the parent was under official court supervision,
there were reports of possible harm from several sources and, indeed,
the state had declared its willingness and intention to prevent such
harm. Hence knowledge, intention and even assurances of action
were not enough. The state, said the Court, was not liable for injury
of this kind because it had not, by affirmative exercise of its powers,
taken the child into its custody or otherwise restrained his liberty or
ability to act for his own protection.8 Under this rationale, the Court
distinguished prior case law and Section 1983 jurisprudence guaran-
teeing safety from violence and basic survival care for prison in-
mates 9 and institutionalized mental patients.10
Along with this major interpretation of the contours of fourteenth
amendment substantive due process liberties-largely along the lines
of "no custody, no duty"-the Court then speculated, in a widely
quoted footnote, on a question easily as important to child welfare
systems and their workers on the one hand and to child advocates on
the other, as the DeShaney issue itself. That is, what if everything
that happened to Joshua DeShaney had happened to a child not in
the custody of a natural parent but under foster care supervision:
Had the State by the affirmative exercise of its power removed Joshua from
free society and placed him in a foster home operated by its agents, we might
have a situation sufficiently analogous to incarceration or institutionalization
to give rise to an affirmative duty to protect .... We express no view on the
3. "Judges and lawyers, like other humans, are moved by natural sympathy in a
case like this to find a way for Joshua and his mother to receive adequate compensa-
tion for the grievous harm inflicted upon them." Id. at 202-03.
4. "The most that can be said of the state functionaries in this case is that they
stood by and did nothing when suspicious circumstances dictated a more active role for
them." Id. at 203.
5. "It may well be that, by voluntarily undertaking to protect Joshua against a
danger concededly played no part in creating, the State acquired a duty under state
tort law to provide him with adequate protection against the danger." Id. at 201-02.
6. Id. at 201.
7. "[T]he State had no constitutional duty to protect Joshua against his father's
violence .... " Id. at 202.
8. Id. at 201.
9. See, e.g., Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 103-04 (1976) (duty to provide prison
inmates with adequate medical care), reh 'g denied, 429 U.S. 1066 (1977).
10. See, e.g., Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 U.S. 307, 314-25 (1982) (duty to provide ade-
quate safety, food, clothing, shelter and medical care for involuntarily committed
mental patients).
[Vol. 18: 353, 1991] A Constitutional Right
PEPPERDINE LAW REVIEW
validity of this analogy, however, as it is not before us in the present case.1 1
Why the Supreme Court chose to make this point is not clear. Sev-
eral plausible reasons, however, include: (i) a desire to emphasize the
narrow confines of the holding; (ii) to illustrate in a child welfare
context the importance of a custodial posture to any recognition of
due process safety obligations on the part of state foster care systems;
(iii) to reassure the child protection community that the massive
arena of state regulated foster care placement was not being stripped
of all federally-based protection; and (iv) to warn state officials in
this field that DeShaney should not be viewed as an across-the-board
shield from liability for misfeasance to children under state protec-
tion and care.
Whatever the case, the Court's analogy touched upon a "hot" ques-
tion and one being tested with increasing frequency. In the two years
since DeShaney, the appellate courts of at least five federal circuits
have had occasion to deal with civil rights suits asserting constitu-
tional or federal statutory rights to safe foster care. 12 The Supreme
Court has denied petitions for certiorari in all three cases in which
certiorari was sought,13 apparently finding the time or occasion not
right to pass on the custody analogy that it posited (but refused to an-
swer) in DeShaney, or else considering the cases presented as so well
decided on this or related grounds as not to require further guidance
beyond DeShaney.
The Court's silence, however, is puzzling. Hopefully, it will not be
long before it decides to answer the "footnote 9" query.14 With al-
11. 489 U.S. 201 n.9 (citing two circuit court decisions both of which found involun-
tary state placement of children in a foster home to be analogous to prison and mental
institution custody rendering state actors liable under section 1983 for fourteenth
amendment violations in providing grossly deficient protection and care in that set-
ting). See Taylor ex rel. Walker v. Ledbetter, 818 F.2d 791, 794-97 (11th Cir. 1987), cert.
denied, 489 U.S. 1065 (1985); Doe v. New York City Dep't of Social Servs., 649 F.2d 134,
14i-42 (2d Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 864 (1983).
12. Eugene D. v. Karman, 889 F.2d 701 (6th Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 2631
(1990) Meador v. Cabinet for Human Resources, 902 F.2d 474 (6th Cir. 1990) cert de-
nied, 111 S. Ct. 182 (1990); Babcock v. Tyler, 884 F.2d 497 (9th Cir. 1989), cert. denied,
110 S. Ct. 1118 (1990); Doe v. Bobbitt, 881 F.2d 510 (7th Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 110 S.
Ct. 2560 (1990); K.H. v. Morgan, 914 F.2d 846 (7th Cir. 1990); Del. A. v. Edwards, 855
F.2d 1148 (5th Cir. 1988), appeal dismissed, 867 F.2d 842 (5th Cir. 1989); Milburn v.
Anne Arundel County Dep't. of Social Servs., 871 F.2d 474 (4th Cir. 1989), cert. denied,
110 S. Ct. 148 (1989).
13. See Eugene D., Bobbitt, and Babcock, supra note 12.
14. Calls for and speculations about Supreme Court delineation of foster care lib-
erty interests have not been wanting in recent years. See, e.g., Mushlin, Unsafe
Havens: The Case for Constitutional Protection of Foster Children from Abuse and Ne-
most 400,000 children in foster care,1 5 a record of serious problems
and strains pressing the foster care system, and a steady procession of
"Joshua's" seeking federal redress, with stories often as compelling
as that presented by DeShaney, it seems certain that Court will soon
be pressed to confront its own challenge.
The post-DeShaney cases raise a number of questions beyond the
"footnote 9" query as to whether foster care custody is sufficiently
analogous to prison and mental institution custody to warrant sub-
stantive due process protection from known or clearly established
threats to safety. These include: (i) the existence of section 1983 lia-
bility based on federal statutory mandates rather than the command
of constitutional due process; (ii) the differences in the duty owed, if
any, to children placed in state supervised foster care on a voluntary
rather than mandatory basis; (iii) the availability of absolute or quali-
fied immunity defenses against section 1983 claims grounded in
either foster care constitutional liberty interests or federal statutory
obligations; and (iv) the applicable standards ("deliberate indiffer-
ence", failure to exercise reasonable professional judgment, or gross
negligence) for measurement of state violations of safe care duties
owed to foster children. This article explores each of these issues af-
ter a preliminary review of the status and legal character of foster
care placement and custody in the United States.
II. FOSTER CARE STATUS
The foster care system evolved as a mechanism to provide a tempo-
rary home-like setting for the protection and nurturing of children
unable to live in a parental home, whether due to conditions of ne-
glect, abuse, abandonment or sheer parental incapacity. Available in
all states, the foster care system removes the child from the natural
home situation while deficiencies are being corrected or arrange-
ments are made for a change in parental responsibility.16
Today, the nation's foster care population is at a record high. After
some contraction in the early eighties, the number of children in fos-
ter care stood at about 275,000 in 1985, rose to 340,000 by 1988, and
today aggregates nearly 400,000.17 The spurt that took place around
1985 and continues today has been characterized by a number of
glect, 23 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 199, 217-244 (1988); Donnella, Safe Foster Care: A
Constitutional Mandate, 19 FAM. L.Q. 79 (1985).
15. See infra notes 17-18 and accompanying text.
16. See Besharov, The Misuse of Foster Care: When the Desire to Help Children
Outruns the Ability to Improve Parental Function, 20 FAM. L.Q. 213, 219-20 (1986);
Comment, Foster Child Abuse in Pennsylvania: Pursuing Actions Against the County
Placement Agency, 94 DICK. L. REV. 501, 502-503 (1990).
17. HOUSE COMM. ON CHILDREN, YOUTH AND FAMILIES, H.R. REP. No. 101-395,
101st Cong., 1st Sess. 17-19 (1990) [hereinafter HOUSE COMM.].
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trends, including the following: (i) more children requiring repeat
placements; (ii) younger children entering out-of-home placements at
increasing rates; (iii) a disproportionately larger number of minority
children in foster care (with longer stays there); (iv) a growing vol-
ume of placements related to drug and alcohol abuse or exposure; (v)
deteriorating social conditions such as homelessness and family disar-
ray; (vi) an insufficient supply of adequate foster family homes .to
meet demands; (vii) and child welfare caseloads accelerating beyond
the ability of foster care systems to provide minimal care and serv-
ices.'8 Present governmental funding of foster care exceeds $1 billion
annually. About 53% of this amount is federally funded with the re-
maining 47% coming from state and local sources. The federal share
is derived primarily from matching funds made available under arti-
cle IV-E of the Social Security Act.' 9
Against this backdrop of caseload and spending growth is the ex-
isting legal structure to assure services and protection for children in
foster custody. Under state or federal legislation, foster children
have procedural rights and substantive rights to protection from
abuse and neglect, as well as rights to services necessary for mainte-
nance of health, well-being, and the fulfillment of basic childhood
needs. Moreover, federal and state enactments have increasingly rec-
ognized implemented concepts of good practice and responsible over-
sight for children in foster care.20 Both social work practice and
federal policy, as reflected in preconditions and proper use of federal
matching funds for foster care, adoption, and other child welfare pur-
poses emphasize avoidance of unnecessary out-of-home placements,
family reunification for children in foster custody wherever possible,
the periodic review of the foster child's progress, permanent planning
(including adoption) for children separated from natural parents for
18. HOUSE COMM., supra note 17, at 5-9. Cf. U.S. ADVISORY BD. ON CHILD ABUSE
AND NEGLECT, CHILD ABUSE AND NEGLECT: CRITICAL FIRST STEPS IN RESPONSE TO A
NATIONAL EMERGENCY 36-37 (1990). What few studies have been conducted show that
rates of abuse and neglect of children in foster care may be greater than those for chil-
dren in the general population. See P. RYAN & E. MCFADDEN, NATIONAL FOSTER
CARE EDUCATION PROJECT: PREVENTING ABUSE IN FAMILY FOSTER CARE 11 (1986) (na-
tional study); Vera Institute of Justice, Foster Home Child Protection 63-64 (Feb. 1981)
(unpublished report covering New York City); cf. Mushlin, supra note 14, at 205-07;
but see Besharov, supra note 16, at 218-19 (citing studies which suggest that reported
foster parent abuse rates are lower than for the general population).
19. HOUSE COMM., supra note 17, at 67, 120-21.
20. The principal federal law governing child welfare practice in general and fos-
ter care systems, assistance, and regulation in particular is the Adoption Assistance
and Child Welfare Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-272, 94 Stat. 500 (1980).
extended periods, greater delegation of authority to foster parents,
and increased state court (i.e., juvenile court) supervision of foster
care placements.2 1
The vast majority of children who enter foster care do so as the re-
sult of a juvenile court order emanating from a neglect or depen-
dency proceeding. This is known as "involuntary placement." In
most cases, the court simply makes an award of custody to a child
welfare agency which then arranges for the foster placement. In ad-
dition, a relatively small but nevertheless significant number of chil-
dren are placed with the child welfare agency by parents without
court proceedings. These "voluntary placements" are generally un-
dertaken pursuant to a signed agreement between the agency and the
child's natural parents. Such contracts are often regulated by state
law and sometimes require court ratification. To the extent that vol-
untary placements seek federal assistance, they are subject to contin-
uing court supervision and certain practice standards and policies. In
assessing procedural and substantive rights, some courts have viewed
voluntary and involuntary placements differently. 22 Although such
distinctions are blurred by an increasing court and state welfare
agency role in voluntary placements,23 the differences may prove to
be critical in the process of assessing the DeShaney footnote 9 query.
For the bulk of cases in which courts place custody in the child
welfare agency, the rights and duties of foster parents are defined by
and emanate from the agency's custodial authority. The agency typi-
cally delegates authority to the foster parents to provide day-to-day
care of a routine nature. However, it retains general powers over a
child's life and, in effect, supervises the foster parents. Thus, deci-
sions such as education, medical care, and discipline are usually made
by the agency or defined in its policies governing foster parents' obli-
gations. The delegation of authority from agency to foster parents
and the rules of the relationship may be established by "standard
form" contracts, by statute or regulation, by the juvenile court's dis-
positional order, or by a combination of these devices. Frequently,
the agency itself is limited in its freedom to delegate functions to fos-
ter parents, notwithstanding a recent trend to treat foster parents as
part of a service delivery team (e.g., to participate in the development
of case plans and to work with natural parents to insure readiness for
21. See generally M. HARDIN & A. SHALLECK, Children Living Apart from their
Parents, in LEGAL RIGHTS OF CHILDREN (R. Horowitz & H. Davidson, eds. 1984).
22. See, e.g., Jorand v. Tennessee, 738 F. Supp. 258, 260 (M.D. Tenn. 1990) (volun-
tary admittance of a boy to a state facility for severely retarded individuals does not
give rise to constitutionally protected safety and basic care rights).
23. See M. HARDIN, Setting Limits on Voluntary Foster Care, in FOSTER CHILDREN
IN THE COURTS (M. Hardin & D. Dodson, eds. 1983).
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a return home) and not merely as daily care givers,24 and to provide
some procedures for foster parents to challenge agency removal ac-
tion or other foster care decisions.25 Thus, even day-to-day care must
generally be scrutinized by the agency. Some state laws specify non-
delegable rights which the agency as custodian must retain.26
III. THE CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO SAFE FOSTER CARE
The Supreme Court expressly declined in DeShaney to rule
whether state-ordered foster care, by analogy to prison custody or in-
voluntary mental commitment, could give rise to a due process duty
to assure the safety of children placed in such custody. It is intrigu-
ing that the Court took time to note that "several Courts of Appeals"
had favored such a duty, citing two cases for the proposition.27 The
Court did not identify contrary authority and the Court seemed to be
inviting lower courts to make the analogy. If so, responses were not
long in coming. In the two years since DeShaney, a number of cases
have arisen in the circuits which potentially presented the ques-
tion.28 Two circuits, departing from DeShaney principles, have made
the protected safety interest analogy. The Court of Appeals for the
Sixth Circuit in Meador v. Cabinet for Human Resources29 held "that
due process extends the right to be free from the infliction of unnec-
essary harm to children in state-regulated foster homes." 30 Similarly,
24. M. HARDIN & A. SHALLECK, supra note 21, at § 9.04.
25. Id. at § 9.05. However, courts have been sparing in recognition of constitution-
ally protected interests of foster parents vis-a-vis children placed with them. See, e.g.,
Drummond v. Fulton County Dep't of Family and Children's Servs., 563 F.2d 1200 (5th
Cir. 1977) (no constitutionally protected familial right to privacy in foster parent/foster
child relationship).
26. M. HARDIN & A. SHALLEK, supra note 21, at 362.
27. Doe v. New York City Dep't of Social Servs., 649 F.2d 134 (2d Cir. 1981), ofter
remand, 709 F.2d 782, cert. denied sub nom., Catholic Home Bureau v. Doe, 464 U.S.
864 (1983) (finding potential Civil Rights Act liability on part of municipal department
and its designated supervisory welfare agency in failing to respond to a known and
continuing safety risk to a foster child subjected to physical beatings and sexual abuse
by foster father but remanding for determinations as to "deliberate indifference" and
causation of harm); Taylor v. Ledbetter, 818 F.2d 791 (11th Cir. 1987) (finding due pro-
cess liberty interest in safe living conditions for child involuntarily placed in custody of
abusing foster parent).
28. Meador v. Cabinet for Human Resources, 902 F.2d 474, (6th Cir. 1990); K.H.
Through Murphy v. Morgan, 914 F.2d 846 (7th Cir. 1990); Milburn v. Anne Arundel
County Dep't of Social Servs., 871 F.2d 474 (4th Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 148
(1989); Babcock v. Tyler, 884 F.2d 497 (9th Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 1118
(1990).
29. 902 F.2d 474 (6th Cir. 1990).
30. Id. at 476.
in KH. v. Morgan,3 1 the Seventh Circuit stated:
Here ... the state removed the child from the custody of her parents; and
having done so, it could no more place her in a position of danger, deliberately
and without justification, without thereby violating her rights under the due
process clause of the fourteenth amendment than it could deliberately and
without justification place a criminal defendant in a jail or prison in which his
health or safety would be endangered without violating his rights ... under
... the Eighth Amendment... if he was a convicted prisoner or the due pro-
cess clause if he was awaiting trial.
3 2
In a third case from the Fourth Circuit, Millburn v. Anne Arundel
County Dep't of Social Services, the court, on facts strikingly similar
to DeShaney, did not find the requisite exercise of a state power in
removing the child from free society which the Supreme Court pos-
ited in footnote 9. Instead, this court noted that the abused child
"was voluntarily placed in the foster home by his natural parents"
and thus was not in state custody or in a predicament created by
state action.
3 3
In yet a fourth case, Babcock v. Tyler, the Ninth Circuit side-
stepped the DeShaney query, finding, without reference to DeShaney
in particular or to due process liberty interests in general, that state
welfare workers, both in their prosecution of neglect and dependency
proceedings and subsequent fulfillment of post-adjudication responsi-
bilities under the terms of court dispositions, were entitled to abso-
lute immunity from liability for placement with a sexually abusing
foster father.3 4 Since the bulk of children in foster custody are
placed there pursuant to court order, this decision would appear to
have the curious effect of insulating all child welfare workers from
liability for disregarding clear danger signals to children in court-
ordered foster care.
The DeShaney rationale for constitutionally protected foster care
treatment may prove problematic in the case of voluntary place-
ments. That rationale, as expressed in the Court's opinion, focuses
on state-imposed restraints:
The rationale ... is simple enough: when the State by the affirmative exercise
of its power so restrains an individual's liberty that it renders him unable to
31. 914 F.2d 846 (7th Cir. 1990).
32. Id. at 842; see also B.H. Johnson, 715 F. Supp. 1387, 1396 (N.D. Ill. 1989) (class
action on behalf of children removed from parents and put under custody of state so-
cial services agency for foster and other out-of-home placement, finding constitutional
rights to safe foster care and basic maintenance plus statutory rights to case review
system and individualized plan services); Artist M. v. Johnson, 726 F. Supp. 690, 699
(N.D. Ill. 1989) (class suit for injunctive relief finding, on motion to dismiss, both statu-
tory and constitutional causes of action, but dismissing the latter for lack of allegations
of indifference to physical and emotional safety of children in foster care or under
home supervision).
33. Milburn v. Anne Arundel County Dept. of Social Servs., 871 F.2d 474 (4th Cir.
1989), cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 148 (1989).
34. Babcock v. Tyler, 884 F.2d 497 (9th Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 1118
(1990).
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care for himself, and at the same time fails to provide for his basic human
needs - e.g., food, clothing, shelter, medical care, and reasonable safety '- it
transgresses the substantive limits on state action set by the Eighth Amend-
ment and the Due Process Clause .... The affirmative duty to protect arises
not from the State's knowledge of the individual's predicament or from its ex-
pressions of intent to help him, but from the limitation which it has imposed
on his freedom to act on his own behalf.3 5
When parents request or voluntarily consent to a foster care cus-
tody arrangement for a child, can it be fairly said that the state has so
restrained the liberty of the child that it must acknowledge and as-
sume an affirmative duty to protect? Prior to DeShaney, courts did
not generally distinguish between voluntary and involuntary place-
ments in the face of section 1983 claims, largely on the grounds that
once a child had come into the hands of the state or its agents, that
dependence alone, particularly for minors and incompetents in insti-
tutional settings, was sufficient to generate affirmative care
responsibilities.
The Second Circuit was so persuaded in a class action for mentally
retarded children where it found a number of "basic care" due pro-
cess violations. The court stated, "We need not decide whether SDC
[Suffolk Developmental Center] residents are at SDC 'voluntarily' or
'involuntarily' because in either case they are entitled to safe condi-
tions and freedom from undue restraint."3 6 Several district courts
reached similar conclusions about equal status for voluntary and in-
voluntary admittees to state facilities,3 7 in some cases positing that
voluntary parental placement in state hands, however it might estop
parents from asserting personal harm or deprivation, could never
compromise the constitutional rights of children under age or mental
disabilities to be protected from dereliction leading to violence or
substandard care.38
35. 489 U.S. 189, 199-200 (1989).
36. Society for Good Will to Retarded Children v. Cuomo, 737 F.2d 1239, 1245 (2d
Cir. 1984).
37. McCartney v. Barg, 643 F. Supp. 1181, 1185-86 (N.D. Ohio 1986)
Defendants' neat "quid pro quo" analysis - that it is only the involuntary na-
ture of the initial commitment that gives rise to the due process rights at issue
- fails to account for practical realities surrounding the commitment of one
such as plaintiff who has been under the care of state institutions since age
ten.
Id. See also Goodman v. Parwiatikar, 570 F.2d 801, 804 (8th Cir. 1978); Kilpak v. Bell,
619 F. Supp. 359, 378 (N.D. Ill. 1985) (in damages claim for fatal beating of retardate,
court commends logic in the cases that find voluntary and involuntary residents enti-
tled to the same constitutional rights to a safe environment).
38. See, e.g., Fialkowski v. Greenwich Home for Children, Inc., 683 F. Supp. 103
(E.D. Pa. 1987) (rights of mentally retarded do not turn on voluntary or involuntary
nature of submission to state care); Naughton v. Bevliaqua, 458 F. Supp. 610, 617-18
After DeShaney, courts were less inclined to find the distinction
between voluntary and involuntary placement irrelevant. Thus, in
Milburn v. Anne Arundel County Department of Social Services,39
the Fourth Circuit held that a child voluntarily placed in a foster
home by his natural parents and then severely physically abused in
that foster home had no due process right against the social services
agency when its workers neglected to remove the child after reports
of probable abuse.40 The court found, comparing the case to
DeShaney, that the State of Maryland had not restrained the foster
child's liberty and that the ward's resulting injury during foster cus-
tody was caused by individuals who were not state actors.41 The
court reached this conclusion notwithstanding the fact that the state
agency located and contracted with these foster parents for the re-
quired care, and inspected and approved the foster home for the vol-
untary placement. Similarly, in Tennessee, a federal district court
found that a child voluntarily committed to a state facility for se-
verely retarded individuals could claim no due process right to a safe
environment, at least when the boy's parents were familiar with con-
ditions at the facility and the state did nothing affirmative to require
the child to remain there.42
It would be unfortunate if the DeShaney rationale for safe custody
obligations did not include voluntary placements. Several federal
courts have rejected the anomaly of imposing liability upon institu-
tional officials for taking no action when involuntarily committed
children are brutalized or deprived of basic needs, but finding no
comparable duty toward voluntarily committed children.43 If the
custody analogy holds for foster placement, then a child in the care
and residence of state selected, licensed, and regulated foster parents
is arguably as much in "custody" as the child housed in a state run
institution or group home. Custody should warrant affirmative du-
ties of safekeeping for both "involuntary" and "voluntary" place-
ments, at least in cases involving formal agency selection and
supervisory responsibilities.
It is significant that Youngberg v. Romeo,44 the anchor and proto-
(D.R.I. 1978); Seide v. Prevost, 536 F. Supp. 1121, 1135 (S.D.N.Y. 1982) (any distinction
between voluntary and involuntary admittees would violate equal protection clause).
39. 871 F.2d 474 (4th Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 1118 (1990).
40. Id. at 476.
41. Id.
42. Jordan v. Tennessee, 738 F. Supp. 258, 259 (M.D. Tenn. 1990).
43. See cases cited supra note 37. See also Association for Retarded Citizens of
N.D. v. Olsen, 561 F. Supp. 473, 484-85 (D.N.D. 1982); New York State Ass'n for Re-
tarded Children, Inc. v. Rockefeller, 357 F. Supp. 752, 762 (E.D.N.Y. 1973); New York
State Ass'n for Retarded Children, Inc. v. Carey, 551 F. Supp. 1165 (E.D.N.Y. 1982),
rv'd, 706 F.2d 956 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 915 (1983).
44. 457 U.S. 307 (1982).
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type of the Court's current doctrine regarding when involuntary civil
custody arrangements generate substantive due process obligations,
involved a retarded young person whose mother literally asked the
local court to admit her son to a state facility on a permanent basis.45
The mother's choice in Youngberg demonstrates how blurred the vol-
untary/involuntary placement classifications regarding child custody
can be. Moreover, this country's legal doctrine has frequently recog-
nized that the interests of children and their neglectful or abusive
parents do not always coincide;46 thus the law should not unquestion-
ingly accept parents as proxies for making "voluntary" custody deci-
sions on behalf of their children. In Smith v. Organization of Foster
Families,47 the Supreme Court itself gave voice to this dilemma, by
stating "[t]he extent to which supposedly 'voluntary' placements are
in fact voluntary has been questioned .... For example, it has been
said that many 'voluntary' placements are in fact coerced by threat of
neglect proceedings and are not in fact voluntary in the sense of the
product of an informed consent." 48
There is a stark and meaningful difference between a state re-
turning an "at risk" child to its natural parents' custody, as in
DeShaney, and a state accepting custodial obligations with parental
consent. In the former case, the state has not really created a new
hazard by its action. In the latter situation, however, the locking of a
child into a state-run and regulated system directly affects the child's
right to traditional parental care, whether affected voluntarily or not.
It must also be recognized that reports and investigations alleging
neglectful or abusive behavior on the part of the parent carries its
own coercive elements which may make a parent's decision to relin-
quish custody not truly voluntary. 49
In light of the foregoing considerations, a per se rule that a "volun-
45. See, e.g., Kolpak v. Bell, 619 F. Supp. 359, 378 (N.D. Ill. 1985) ("it is significant
that the plaintiff in Youngberg was committed upon his mother's application.").
46. See, e.g., AMERICAN BAR ASS'N AND INST. OF JUDICIAL ADMIN. JUVENILE JUS-
TICE STANDARD, COUNSEL FOR PRIVATE PARTIES § 2.3(b) (1980) (calling for independ-
ent representation of children, apart from counsel for respondent parents, in neglect,
dependency, custody, and adoption proceedings).
47. 431 U.S. 816 (1977).
48. Id. at 834. (rejection of foster parents' challenge to New York statutory and
regulatory procedures for removing foster children from foster homes).
49. These elements may not be as clearcut as in neglect and dependency proceed-
ings leading to court orders. It is true that some voluntary placement schemes by
overwhelmed parents may fall short of a "state custody" model even when welfare sys-
tem counseling and assistance is present to help the troubled parents deal with those
decisions.
tary" placement always excuses official liability for extreme indiffer-
ence to known safety and care hazards would surely be detrimental
to children and mental incompetents. 50 More often than not, there
will be the same state court or state agency supervision of "volun-
tary" placements as is imposed on court-ordered placements. Indeed,
the Adoption Assistance and Child Welfare Act of 1980,51 which pro-
vides funding for voluntary foster care placement, mandates court re-
view and a determination as to the appropriateness of any such
placements as a condition of federal assistance if placement continues
beyond 180 days.52 All this further blurs the soundness of voluntary/
involuntary placement distinctions in assessing safe care duties owed
to children in foster custody.
IV. IMMUNITY OF AGENCIES AND OFFICIALS
If DeShaney has served as a torch for definition and debate on the
contours of a constitutional right to safe foster care, it has also fueled
ambivalence on questions of official responsibility that attend emerg-
ing due process strictures of this kind. In virtually every post-
DeShaney case to reach federal appellate courts, the defense of offi-
cial immunity has been asserted.53
In the Sixth Circuit5 4 and the Seventh Circuit,55 defendants as-
serted qualified immunity defenses based on summary judgment mo-
tions in civil rights actions brought on behalf of abused foster
children. Both circuits soon declared the existence of a substantive
due process right to safe foster care, although each had difficulty, in
their first encounter with the issue, in finding that the law was suffi-
ciently and clearly established to put the defendants on notice of
their duties to the foster children.56
Under governing legal principles, the doctrine of qualified immu-
nity protects public officials performing discretionary duties from lia-
bility for violation of constitutional or statutory rights unless (i) the
rights allegedly violated more clearly established at the time of the
challenged conduct and (ii) they would understand, by reference to
50. Children and incompetents have always been considered to have legal disabili-
ties and to need special state protection and care. See e.g., New York State Ass'n for
Retarded Children, Inc. v. Rockefeller, 357 F. Supp. 752, 764-65 (E.D.N.Y. 1973). For an
excellent analysis of Millburn and the deficits of voluntary/involuntary placement dis-
tinctions, see Oren, DeShaney's Unfinished Business; The Foster Child's Due Process
Right to Sqfety, 69 N.C.L. REV. 113, 133-47 (1990).
51. 2 U.S.C. § 672(e) (1982).
52. 42 U.S.C. § 622 (1980).
53. See, e.g., infra note 54-55 and accompanying text.
54. Eugene D. v. Karman, 889 F.2d 701 (6th Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 2631
(1990).
55. Doe v. Bobbit, 881 F.2d 510 (7th Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 2560 (1990).
56. Eugene D., 889 F.2d at 706; Bobbitt, 881 F.2d at 510.
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an "objective reasonableness" test, that what they were doing
amounted to such a violation.57 In Eugene D. v. Karman,58 the Sixth
Circuit was unable to discern any clearly established constitutional
duty for child welfare officials to protect foster children "from bodily
harm at the hand of a state licensed foster parent."5 9 The appellate
court could identify only one case60 which could have put the defend-
ants on notice; and there were no Supreme Court opinions on point.
Nor would the illegality of the action, in the court's view, be apparent
from Supreme Court precedent on affirmative duties to assure the
safety and basic needs of prison inmates and state mental institution
patients, since their situation involved significant differences from
the community-based life of a foster child.61
In Doe v. Bobbitt,62 the Seventh Circuit made similar observations
about a period of foster abuse that extended from late 1983 into 1984:
[We are unable to conclude that in early 1984 a substantial consensus had
been reached that placing a child in a potentially dangerous environment in a
foster home was a violation of the due process clause. At that time, only the
Second Circuit had held that such a right existed and that case was not di-
rectly on point since it involved placement in a licensed foster home on a per-
manent basis .... Moreover, the decision in Doe depended upon an absolutely
novel analogy between incarceration and placement in a foster home, an anal-
ogy that has yet to be endorsed by either the Supreme Court or the Seventh
Circuit.6 3
In these analyses, the courts acknowledged the wisdom and hints of
the DeShaney decision but viewed that decision as little more than
hindsight in a complex and novel area. Moreover, the existing Sixth
and Seventh Circuit interpretive doctrine was deemed to neutralize
the Second Circuit precedent. Decisions of both circuits accorded lit-
tle credit to case law in other jurisdictions for purposes of determin-
ing whether a constitutional right had been "clearly established" for
57. See Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800 (1982):
[Q]ualified immunity would be defeated if an official "knew or reasonably
should have known that the action he took within his sphere of official re-
sponsibility would violate the constitutional rights of the [plaintiff], or if he
took the action with the malicious intention to cause a deprivation of consti-
tutional rights or other injury."
Id. at 815-19 (emphasis in original); See also Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635 (1987)
(qualified immunity is an affirmative defense to a "clearly established" right).
58. 889 F.2d 701 (6th Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 2631 (1990).
59. Eugene D., 889 F.2d at 709-10.
60. Id. at 708; See Doe v. New York City Dep't of Social Servs., 649 F.2d 134 (2d
Cir. 1981), cert. denied sub norm., Catholic Home Bureau v. Doe, 464 U.S. 864 (1983).
61. Eugene D., 889 F.2d at 709-10.
62. 881 F.2d 510 (7th Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 2560 (1990).
63. Id. at 511-12.
state actors in the home circuit.64
These growing pains for the emerging right were temporary. It has
now been recognized in four circuits,65 and, of course, the DeShaney
footnote 9 query has put all state governments on notice of the likely
custodial status duties and liberty interests applicable to court-or-
dered foster placement. In addition, the nation's major bar associa-
tion, the American Bar Association, has declared its support for the
right and circulated its views to all fifty state welfare departments. 66
It is unlikely that welfare administrators' or supervisors' claims that
they had no notice that foster care custody, at least via involuntary
placement, generates affirmative state duties to protect wards and
meet their basic needs would be a successful defense. The new bat-
tles will be fought, no doubt, on questions concerning the character
of welfare worker misfeasance in specific cases of agency and mana-
gerial level responsibility for violations by subordinate staff, and for
preparation of line workers to understand and comply with state fos-
ter care obligations.
Beyond questions of establishment, notice, and proof of foster care
due process rights, another significant concern remains. This in-
volves whether and to what extent child welfare workers should be
immune from liability for official action which violates constitutional
rights of safe foster care. That issue will undoubtedly be addressed
by litigation in the years ahead - and properly so. It is exemplified
by the Ninth Circuit's apparent position that virtually all child wel-
fare worker activities undertaken in connection with court neglect
and dependency proceedings, and the execution and monitoring of
dispositional orders emanating from them, are entitled to absolute
immunity, whether styled as "judicial," "quasi-judicial," or
"prosecutorial." 67 This, of course, extends beyond foster care treat-
ment issues, but could significantly restrict welfare system accounta-
bility under any constitutional right of safe foster care.
64. See, e.g., Davis v. Holly, 835 F.2d 1175, 1182 (6th Cir. 1987) (novel decision from
another circuit not sufficient to clearly establish a constitutional right); Lojuk v. John-
son, 770 F.2d 619, 631 (7th Cir. 1985) (single supporting circuit and district court case
insufficient to clearly establish a constitutional right), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 1067
(1988).
65. See Kitt v. Morgan, 914 F.2d 846 (7th Cir. 1990); Meador v. Cabinet for Human
Resources, 902 F.2d 474 (6th Cir. 1990); Taylor ex reL. Walker v. Ledbetter, 818 F.2d 791
(11th Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 489 U.S. 1065 (1985); Doe v. New York City Dep't. of So-
cial Servs. 649 F.2d 134 (2nd Cir. 1981).
66. See AMERICAN BAR ASS'N., POLICY AND PROCEDURES HANDBOOK, 1989-1990, at
189 (summarizing 1990 policy resolution of the Association supporting legal responsi-
bility and liability of state and local governments for injury or abuse to children in fos-
ter care custody in disregard of information as to ongoing or imminent harm).
67. Babcock v. Tyler, 884 F.2d 497, 503 (9th Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 1118
(1990).
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Thus, in Babcock v. Tyler,68 a post-DeShaney opinion, the court ex-
panded upon established circuit precedent extending absolute immu-
nity to social service case workers where they initiate and pursue
child dependency proceedings and obtain and execute court orders
for seizure and placement of children. The Babcock court ruled that
such immunity extended to misfeasance in all phases of post-judicia-
tion monitoring, execution, and supervision of court neglect and de-
pendency orders.69 Hence, misfeasance or nonfeasance in the face of
reports of dangerous and harmful conduct toward children by foster
parents named in court orders appears to have been brought under a
shield of absolute immunity.7 0 As the court explained:
In Washington, the dependency process does not end until six months after
the dependent child returns home.... Throughout this process, caseworkers
need to exercise independent judgment in fulfilling their post-adjudication du-
ties .... There is little sense in granting immunity up through adjudication of
dependency, and then exposing caseworkers to liability for services performed
in monitoring child placement and custody decisions pursuant to court orders.
These post-adjudication actions by social caseworkers may or may not be
prosecutorial in nature.7 1
This was a complicated case, involving neglect proceedings and trans-
actions in several states, which revealed serious social worker derelic-
tion in the placement of the four girls with a foster father who raped
and sexually assaulted all of them. There exists a split among the
circuits about the extent and character of the immunity available to
social service workers connected with or involved in court proceed-
ings or court-mandated supervision. Absolute immunity for bringing
and participating in neglect and abuse proceedings is recognized in
some circuits, generally as a necessary element for protection of the
integrity of such proceedings. 72 Only qualified immunity is afforded
in others.73
68. Id.
69. Id.
70. Id. at 503.
71. Id.
72. See Meyers v. Contra Costa County Dep't of Social Servs., 812 F.2d 1154 (9th
Cir. 1987); Coverdell v. Dep't of Soc. and Health Ser., 834 F.2d 758 (9th Cir. 1987);
Malachowski v. City of Keene, 787 F.2d 704, 712 (lst Cir. 1986) (absolute immunity for
juvenile officer who filed allegedly false delinquency petition), cert. denied, 479 U.S.
828 (1986); Kurzawa v. Mueller, 732 F.2d 1456, 1457-58 (6th Cir. 1984) (absolute immu-
nity for state social services employees responsible for prosecuting child neglect and
delinquency petitions).
73. See Hodoroski v. Ray, 844 F.2d 1210, 1216 (5th Cir. 1988); Austin v. Borel, 830
F.2d 1356 (5th Cir. 1987); Galvan v. Garmon, 710 F.2d 214 (5th Cir. 1983), cert. denied,
466 U.S. 949 (1984); Robison v. Via, 821 F.2d 913, 920 (2d Cir. 1987) (declined to grant
absolute prosecutorial immunity to state trooper and assistant state's attorney for con-
duct in undertaking preliminary child abuse report investigation).
The basic rule is that "executive officials in general are usually en-
titled to only qualified or good-faith immunity."74 Despite the pre-
cept that qualified immunity from damages liability should be the
norm for officials executing discretionary functions who are charged
with constitutional violations, there are exceptions in which absolute
immunity has been determined to be proper. One such exception
protects prosecutors, and officials who perform functions analogous
to prosecutors, 75 including the initiation of certain administrative and
civil proceedings on behalf of the government.76 Another exception
shields officials appearing as court witnesses, a role obviously integral
to the judicial process. 7 7
Babcock v. Tyler, however, appears to go beyond the bounds of the
classic "qualified immunity" exceptions by embracing and protecting
post-adjudication behavior of child welfare workers. It would seem
to extend greater protection to these state agency workers than even
court attached probation officers who, although shielded absolutely
in pretrial and pre-sentencing investigation functions, 78 are neverthe-
less accorded only a qualified immunity in post-adjudication activities
relating to investigation and to initiation of revocation for offenders
in probation status.79 Child welfare workers would also have greater
immunity than would prison officials who undertake post-adjudica-
tion investigations of prisoner misbehavior.8 0 The rationale in those
cases seems absent in situations where, after placement of a foster
child, supervising workers obtain knowledge of abusive foster parent
behavior or unsafe conditions. This has little to do with judicial pro-
ceedings and involves matters probably not governed or foreseen by
neglect and dependency orders.S1 Moreover, the acts complained of
here (typically inaction in the face of warnings or reports of abuse to
74. Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800 (1982).
75. Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409 (1976).
76. Butz v..Economou, 438 U.S. 478, 515-16 (1978) (absolute immunity extended to
agency attorney prosecuting suspension proceeding before administrative law judge);
Kurzawa, 732 F.2d at 1456-58 (absolute immunity extended to attorney serving as
guardian ad litem for child and involved in court proceedings for removal from paren-
tal home).
77. Briscoe v. LaHue, 460 U.S. 325 (involving a police officer's perjured testimony
as a criminal trial witness and extending common law witness immunity to section
1983 claims); cert. denied sub nom, Talley v. Crosson, 460 U.S. 1037 (1983).
78. See, e.g., Dorman v. Higgins, 821 F.2d 133 (2d Cir. 1987) (protection of
presentence report statements); Spaulding v. Nielson, 599 F.2d 728 (5th Cir. 1979) (pro-
tection of presentence report activities); Tripati v. I.N.S., 784 F.2d 345 (10th Cir. 1986)
(protection of pretrial release reports), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 1028 (1988); Hughes v.
Chesser, 731 F.2d 1489 (11th Cir. 1984) (protection of state probation officers in prepa-
ration and presentation of presentence reports); Burkes v. Callion, 433 F.2d 318 (9th
Cir. 1970) (protection of probation report), cert. denied, 403 U.S. 908 (1971).
79. See Galvan v. Garmon, 710 F.2d 214 (5th Cir. 1983).
80. Cleavinger v. Saxner, 474 U.S. 193 (1985) (qualified immunity for prison disci-
plinary committee members).
81. Court orders generally do not specify in which foster home a child will be
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wards) do not arise out of events which should ordinarily deter social
services workers from taking protective action because of fear of un-
founded litigation or other legal harassment. Indeed, such signals
should help stimulate worker investigative or remedial action to
avoid that very possibility.
V. STANDARDS OF CULPABILITY FOR MEASURING
VIOLATIONS OF RIGHTS
Most "safe foster care" decisions involving constitutional rights
claims have been decided on motions for summary judgment or mo-
tions to dismiss complaints. Few cases have gone to trial. Thus, the
courts have had little occasion to elaborate on the specific kinds of
conduct, non-feasance, or neglect which would support liability in
this context.
The prevailing standard during most of the past decade has been
that of "deliberate indifference" in failure to respond to threats to or
violations of a child's "clearly established rights." The two appellate
decisions cited by the Supreme Court in DeShaney footnote 9 provide
a good illustration. In both Taylor v. Ledbetter82 and Doe v. New
York City Department of Social Services,83 the courts determined lia-
bility upon a finding of "deliberate indifference"8 4 as a significant
causal factor in the harm resulting from a violation of constitution-
ally protected interests:ss
For a section 1983 action to arise where an official is charged
with failing to exercise an affirmative duty, two requirements
must be satisfied. First, the failure to act must have been a sub-
stantial factor leading to the violation of a constitutionally pro-
tected liberty or property interest . . . . Second, the official
having the responsibility to act must display deliberate indiffer-
ence. 86
Other circuits have found the "professional judgment" criterion an-
nounced by the Supreme Court in its child institutionalization cases
to be more applicable and have used that in lieu of a "deliberate in-
placed, but rather that custody is vested in the child welfare agency. See K.H. v. Mor-
gan, 914 F.2d 846, 853 (7th Cir. 1990).
82. 818 F.2d 791 (11th Cir. 1987), cerL denied, 489 U.S. 1065 (1989).
83. 649 F.2d 134 (2nd Cir. 1981), cert. denied sub nora., Catholic Home Bureau v.
Doe, 464 U.S. 864 (1983).
84. See Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 105 (1976), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 974 (1977).
85. Taylor, 818 F.2d at 794; Doe v. New York City Dep't of Social Servs., 649 F.2d
141.
86. Taylor, 818 F.2d at 794.
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difference" test. Here, once the constitutionally protected interest
has been violated, official liability turns on whether the officers in
question adhered to accepted professional standards and practices in
making their decisions to place or maintain children in situations of
known risk.8 7
Both the "deliberate indifference" and "departure from profes-
sional standards" tests are broad. Part of the Supreme Court's unfin-
ished agenda in foster care custody rights will be to lend some
particularity to those standards in the foster care context. Even in
the limited adjudication on the question thus far, appellate courts
have sought to furnish such guidance. In Doe v. New York City De-
partment of Social Services, the Second Circuit was quick to recog-
nize that the "deliberate indifference" test, as previously applied to
"the supervision of wardens, police chiefs, and hospital administra-
tors," involved different considerations when applied to foster care
agencies' supervision of the families it licensed.8 8 It found a firmer
line of authority and greater ease of monitoring in the institutional
setting than existed in foster home custody where only occasional su-
pervisory visits could be made and less exercise of hierarchical au-
thority was desirable.8 9 This was so because good foster care
attempts to approximate a normal family environment, where few in-
trusions and respect for foster family autonomy and integrity are
deemed necessary for a successful placement.90 These differences led
the Second Circuit to conclude that "deliberate indifference ought
not to be inferred from a failure to act as readily as might be done in
the prison context, since in the foster care situation, there are obvi-
ous alternative explanations for a family being given the benefit of
the doubt."91
Similar caution has been exercised by courts which have embraced
the "professional judgment" standard. In KH. v. Morgan,92 the Sev-
enth Circuit acknowledged a constitutionally protected right to safe
foster care - what it called a "rudimentary duty of safekeeping."9 3
The court took a restrictive view of agency and worker responsibility,
building into the "professional judgement" test a defense for lack of
87. See, e.g., Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 U.S. 307, 323 (1982):
[T]he decision, if made by a professional, is presumptively valid; liability may
be imposed only when the decision by the professional is such a substantial
departure from accepted professional judgment, practice, or standards as to
demonstrate that the person responsible actually did not base the decision on
such a judgment.
Id.
88. New York City Dep't of Social Servs., 649 F.2d at 141-42.
89. Id. at 142.
90. Id.
91. Id.
92. 914 F.2d 846 (7th Cir. 1990).
93. Id. at 849.
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resources so that no liability would attach, even for placements in-
volving known risks of abuse, if the responsible agency and workers
did not have resources to assure a proper placement.94
KH. v. Morgan involved a young girl taken from her parents by
the Juvenile Court of Cook County and subjected to nine foster
placements in three and one half years, some which involved beat-
ings and sexual assaul. In its detailed exploration of the "profes-
sional judgment" test as applied to foster care cases, the court
emphasized a narrow approach to agency and worker liability even in
the face of known risks to the child. It stressed the law's antipathy
to damage suits in these situations, the national crisis in securing ade-
quate foster care facilities, and the minimal nature of the state's
parens patriae obligations in caring for children removed from natu-
ral parents and placed under state custody.95 Nevertheless, the opin-
ion seemed to raise more questions than it answered. Would mild
signals of danger of abuse followed by no investigation whatever pro-
duce the requisite failure to follow professional judgment? Where
reports or a history of abuse by particular foster parents were unmis-
takable, would agency personnel really be protected in making or tol-
erating a "risky" placement on grounds that there were no other
foster homes or institutional placements available?
All courts now seem to agree, following Supreme Court precedents
in other areas,96 that negligence or even gross negligence in placing
or leaving foster children in harm's way is not enough to trigger lia-
bility. There must be some element of knowledge of potential danger
or risk to the child's safety.97 How case specific and how strong such
knowledge must be under a given set of circumstances remains to be
clarified.
94. Id. at 867-68. This position was derived from the Supreme Court's guidance in
Youngberg, in which the Court stated, "[iln an action for damages against a profes-
sional in his individual capacity, however, the professional will not be liable if he was
unable to satisfy his normal professional standards because of budgetary constraints in
such a situation, good-faith immunity would bar liability." Id. at 867 n.18 (Coffey, J.,
concurring in part, dissenting in part) (quoting Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 U.S. 307, 323
(1982)).
95. Id. at 853.
96. Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S 327 (1986) (mere negligence of a state employee
does not constitute deprivation under fourteenth amendment's due process clause);
City of Canton v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378 (1989) (gross negligence rejected as standard for
municipal official supervisory liability for failure to train).
97. See, e.g., Morgan, 914 F.2d at 852 (neither negligence nor gross negligence
alone can support required elements of knowledge and deliberate action for rights vio-
lations); New York City Dep't of Social Servs., 649 F.2d at 143 (gross negligence is not
"deliberate indifference" but can create a presumption of the latter).
VI. LIABILITY BASED ON FEDERAL STATUTORY VIOLATIONS
There are two additional avenues which can be used to vindicate
children's rights to safe foster care conditions in state operated sys-
tems. One avenue has been through civil rights suits under section
1983.98 Plaintiffs may assert a section 1983 claim for a state actor's
violation of federal statutory duties,99 specifically those duties under
the Adoption Assistance and Child Welfare Act of 1980.100 Another
possibility involves procedural due process claims based on a wrong-
ful deprivation of rights and benefits applicable to foster care custody
created under state law and regulation.101
It has not been uncommon for plaintiffs who allege the deprivation
of constitutional rights to safe foster care to include alternate claims
based on violations of the Adoption Assistance Act.102 These conten-
tions have been quite successful. Most circuits called upon to address
the issue have found that the Act's mandates give rise to "enforcea-
ble rights, privileges and immunities" under section 1983 of the Civil
Rights Act, and to an implied right of private action under the Adop-
tion Assistance Act itself. The Act is the federal government's basic
regulatory and funding legislation for adoption, foster care, and child
neglect and abuse services provided by state and local governments.
It originated as a section of the Aid to Families with Dependent Chil-
dren program and was then converted, by virtue of the Adoption
Assistance Act, into separate subtitles of the Social Security Code.
The Adoption Assistance Act provides for payment to states for
foster care and adoption services on behalf of eligible children. In ad-
dition, it mandates the development of state plans as a condition of
funding eligibility, and recites a number of service obligations (or,
correlatively, service rights) which must be included and imple-
mented in the state plans. Several of these entitlements have been
explicitly held in federal court litigation to be enforceable under Sec-
tion 1983 and through private suits under the Act.103
Thus, Adoption Assistance Act complaints have sought redress for
98. 42 U.S.C. § 1983,(1979).
99. Section 1983 provides for liability to injured parties for deprivation of rights
secured not only by the Constitution but also by federal laws.
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom,
or usage, of any State... subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the
United States . .. to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities
secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an
action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress.
42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1979).
100. Pub. L. No. 96-272, 99 Stat. 500 (1980) (codified, as amended, at 42 U.S.C.
§§ 620-625, 670-679 (1988)).
101. See Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 576-578 (1972).
102. The Adoption Assistance Act is now codified in Titles IV-B and IV-E of the
Social Security Act. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 620-25 (1988); 42 U.S.C. §§ 670-79 (1988).
103. See cases cited inkfra notes 113-116.
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violation of statutory mandates that agencies (i) "make reasonable ef-
forts" to prevent the removal of children from their homes or to re-
turn recently removed children to their families; (ii) notify
appropriate agencies when children are being mistreated in foster
care placements; (iii) develop and review case plans to assure that
proper services are provided to children in foster care; (iv) maintain
standards for foster family homes and child care institutions which
are in accord with recommended standards of national organizations,
including those relating to admission policies, safety, sanitation, and
protection of civil rights; (v) operate a case review system for each
child receiving foster care supervision; and (vi) develop permanent
plans for placement of neglected and dependent children. Some
courts have upheld claims for both money damages and equitable re-
lief,10 4 although others, while not foreclosing injunctive relief, have
read the act to preclude money damages.l0 5 The Supreme Court has
not yet dealt with the section 1983 and implied cause of action reme-
dies in the foster care context, but will inevitably be called upon to
do so.
Some of the strictures of the Adoption Assistance Act go beyond
the basic care and safety of foster children (the major focus of this
article). Others relate quite directly to foster care safety, i.e., the ob-
ligation of the state to take action when it has reason to believe a
home is "unsuitable . . .because of . . . neglect, abuse or exploita-
tion."'10 6 Thus, in L.J. v. Massinga,l0 7 the Fourth Circuit affirmed a
district court ruling that present and former foster children super-
vised by the Baltimore City Department of Social Services were enti-
tled to injunctive relief and money damages to redress physical,
sexual, and medical neglect 08 that had resulted from improper ad-
ministration of the city's federally funded program activities. In
Lynch v. Dukakis,109 the First Circuit, in a class action on behalf of
children under the jurisdiction of the Massachusetts foster family
home care system, upheld private action rights and the issuance of
preliminary injunctive relief to enforce the state's case plan and case
review obligations under the Adoption Assistance Act, including a
104. L.J. v. Massinga, 838 F.2d 118 (4th,Cir. 1988); Joseph A. v. New Mexico Dep't
of Human Servs., 575 F. Supp. 346 (D.N.M. 1983).
105. Lesher v. Lavrich, 784 F.2d 193, 198 (6th Cir. 1986).
106. 42 U.S.C.A. § 671(a)(9) (West Supp. 1990).
107. Massinga, 838 F.2d at 124.
108. Id. at 118.
109. 719 F.2d 504 (1st Cir. 1983).
worker caseload limit.11o Finally, in one of the most recent and de-
tailed analyses of section 1983 and implied action rights in this area,
the Seventh Circuit, in Artist M. v. Johnson,"'1 determined that the
Act's obligations (case plan development, notification of mistreat-
ment, and "reasonable efforts" with respect to prevention of removal
and reunification of foster children) were enforceable under section
1983 or under the Act itself."12 The court undertook a careful analy-
sis of the situation of the plaintiff class against current Supreme
Court standards for section 1983 claims"13 and implied private ac-
tions1 4 and, in both cases, the Adoption Assistance Act claims
emerged as actionable.
In a few instances in which federal appellate courts have denied
private relief under federal foster care legislative guaranties, the
plaintiff groups were essentially asserting parental interests"i5 or in-
terests of parents and children who were no longer in foster custody,
but rather were in natural or adoptive parental homes."16
However, two federal circuits have found a right of access to fed-
eral protection based on state foster care legislative schemes. In Tay-
lor v. Ledbetter,117 the court found sufficient protective
responsibilities, based on a number of duties articulated in the Geor-
gia child care statutory scheme, to give rise to procedural due process
obligations of the state to follow such mandates. The court was thus
able to support an independent ground of affirmative obligation dis-
tinct from the substantive due process contentions that it also up-
heldl18 and which the Supreme Court cited in the DeShaney footnote
9 speculation on "safe foster care" rights.
The Sixth Circuit took a comparable position in a more recent case,
Meador v. Cabinet for Human Resources."19 Here, in addition to its
articulation of substantive due process rights to freedom from inflic-
tion of unnecessary harm while in foster care,120 the court, citing
110. Id. at 508.
111. 917 F.2d 980 (7th Cir. 1990).
112. Id. at 988-89.
113. Wilder v. Virginia Hosp. Ass'n, 110 S. Ct. 2510, 2524-25 (1990).
114. Cort v. Ash, 422 U.S. 66, 78 (1975).
115. Lesher v. Lavrich 784 F.2d 193, 197-98 (6th Cir. 1986) (affirming summary
judgment against parents in a section 1983 suit in which the parents seek custody of
their children. The court declined, however, to hold that the Adoption Assistance Act
permits no private enforcement, especially in actions, unlike this one, to force state of-
ficials to revise procedures and comply with statutory obligations).
116. Griffith v. Johnston, 899 F.2d 1427 (5th Cir. 1990).
117. 818 F.2d 791 (11th Cir. 1987) (state statutory mandates for thorough investiga-
tion and evaluation of foster care homes, regular inspection of licensing agencies and
foster homes, and regular home visits relied upon as basis for procedural due process
claim to foster child protection).
118. Id. at 795.
119. 902 F.2d 474 (7th Cir. 1990).
120. Id. at 476.
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Taylor, acknowledged that Kentucky had a legislative obligation to
provide foster children with "a program of care, treatment and reha-
bilitation"121 and to "be responsible for the operation, management
and development of the existing state facilities for the custodial care
and rehabilitation of children."122 The court found this to support a
procedural due process claim for proper discharge of such responsi-
bilities on the part of Kentucky officials.12 3 It should be stressed that
in virtually all of the foregoing determinations, the courts were
speaking of potential liability in summary dispositions and thus were
without occasion to pass on questions such as the adequacy of eviden-
tiary showings to establish statutory violations, the relationship of
such violations to claimed harm, and compensable damages flowing
from the defaults.
It is important that the Supreme Court validate these judgments as
to statutory bases for assertion of protectable rights of foster chil-
dren. Claims of this kind will no doubt arise with frequency in fu-
ture litigation involving the nation's hard-pressed foster care
apparatus. For example, despite what appears to be a clear weight of
authority for section 1983 and implied action enforcement of the
Adoption Assistance Act obligations, occasional hesitation on the part
of the Supreme Court to approve broad interpretations of individual
rights in areas of federally supported social service delivery needs to
be clarified in the foster care arena.124
VII. CONCLUSIONS AND SOME REMAINING DILEMMAS
Despite Supreme Court silence on the specific issue, it seems fair to
conclude that a constitutional right to "safe foster care" has arrived
and is now operative in the United States. The right is grounded in
fourteenth amendment substantive due process liberty interests and
is claimable at least by children placed by official mandate in state
foster care custody. Its scope encompasses protection from inten-
tional infliction of injury and the provision of basic essentials includ-
ing food, shelter, and medical care. These rights are not, as some
121. Id.
122. Id.
123. Id. at 476-77.
124. See, e.g., Pennhurst State School and Hosp. v. Halderman, 451 U.S. 1 (1981) (no
implied private right of action under federal-state funding program for the develop-
mentally disabled); Blum v. Yaretsky, 457 U.S. 991 (1982) (extensive federal regulation
and monetary payments to nursing home operators do not make the latter's conduct
actionable as "state action" under section 1983).
commentators have speculated, dependent on constitutional "cruel
and unusual punishment" guarantees or the "special relationship"
doctrine that has been recognized in some cases to establish affirma-
tive duties to individuals who are not strictly in state custody.125 It
appears to be rooted in affirmative governmental obligations which
arise when the state assumes custody of an individual (whether as de-
tainee or ward) and thereby substantially forecloses that individual's
opportunities and capacity for self-protection and maintenance (or ac-
cess to other options or assistance to that end).
It now seems clear that state-controlled foster care placement con-
stitutes "custody" - indeed, the kind of "custody" for whose safety
and physical adequacy the state must stand responsible and as to
which "more than negligent" withholding or denial can be a constitu-
tionally actionable deprivation. This is so regardless of whether the
care is supervised by governmental welfare offices or by private con-
tractors retained to manage foster care programs and whether the
care is provided in group homes by the state or in private dwellings
by private citizens licensed and supervised to perform that function.
What remains to be resolved about this constitutional right is con-
siderable. It represents a playing field fraught with uncertainty and
potential legal conflict. First, we need to know, with more certainty,
what kinds of conduct are violative of the right and what the stan-
dards for measuring such violations are. We need to know what obli-
gations are imposed on line professionals who supervise foster
families, and what obligations their supervisors and government units
must discharge. We need to know, further, when and whether state
actors (including agents who become state actors) can properly claim
immunity from liability for violation of the right, and what kinds of
voluntarily requested state foster service arrangements fall outside
the ambit of the right. Finally, we should have some clarification of
whether and when, outside of pure custodial relationships, state fore-
closure of opportunity and freedom relative to foster parent and fos-
ter child issues can form the basis for deprivation of this
constitutionally protected liberty interest of safe foster care.
Here, then, is a suggested course through the foregoing thicket.
Answers are necessary since the inherent conflicts in state/natural
parent/foster parent/foster child relationships should increase rather
than diminish in a future marked by family disrepair, increasing inci-
dence of child abuse, and growing numbers of children who must find
their way to adulthood, at least for significant periods of time, with-
out responsible parental care. The ultimate solutions will probably
125. See Donnella, Sofe Foster Care: A Constitutional Mandate, 19 FAM. L.Q. 79
(1985); Oren, The State's Failure to Protect Children and Substantive Due Process:
DeShaney in Context, 68 N.C.L. REv. 659, 677-83 (1990).
[Vol. 18: 353, 1991] A Constitutional Right
PEPPERDINE LAW REVIEW
depend more on state legislative and welfare system initiatives, and
recourse to improved legal remedies short of constitutional and fed-
eral civil rights claims,126 than on section 1983 jurisprudence. How-
ever, the constitutional dimensions of the problem cannot be avoided.
The following, in the author's view, suggests the contours for appli-
cation of a liberty interest in safe foster care that is defined soundly
and is consistent with Supreme Court pronouncements in related ar-
eas of individual rights:
(i) Applicable Standards. The standards of "deliberate indiffer-
ence" or "failure to exercise professional judgment" in the face of
known deficiencies or risks will both work as tests for official liabil-
ity where rights to protection and care have been violated. However,
the Supreme Court appears to have cast the die in favor of a "profes-
sional judgment" test and that needs to be made clear. An advantage
of the "professional judgment" yardstick is the existence of a multi-
plicity of state and federal legislative prescriptions with which to de-
fine and measure this standard.127 On the other hand, professional
guidelines and standards on reporting and investigational and disposi-
tional decisionmaking in child protection cases are less than specific,
not terribly uniform, and vary with the specific stages of intervention
and official action involved.128 Thus, assessing the tolerances of "pro-
fessional judgment" in a specific situation may require extended
factfinding and difficult calibration of general prescriptions as to fac-
tors to be considered and the strength of evidence needed to impart
knowledge or suspicion of child abuse.
126. State negligence actions, the traditional remedy for injury and harm to abused
foster children, are beset with difficult barriers, including sovereign immunity in many
states, undue deference to agency judgment, difficulties of proving actionable negli-
gence, the shifting of responsibility to judgment-proof foster parents, and foster parent
enjoyment of parental immunity for negligent care. See Mushlin, Unsafe Havens: The
Case for Constitutional Protection of Foster Children From Abuse and Neglect, 23
HARv. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 199, 244-51 (1988). Comment, Foster Child Abuse in Penn-
sylvania: Pursuing Actions Against the County Placement Agency, 94 DICK. L. REV.
501, 504-08 (1990).
127. See, e.g., the citation of statutory protective services obligations in Meador v.
Cabinet for Human Resources, 902 F.2d 474, 476 (6th Cir. 1990) and Taylor v. Ledbet-
ter, 818 F.2d 791, 798-99 (11th Cir. 1987), to help define professional obligations of the
defendant welfare agencies and workers as well as the foster services duties imposed
by the Adoption Assistance and Child Welfare Act.
128. See Besharov, Child Abuse and Neglect Reporting and Investigation: Policy
Guidelines for Decisionmaking, 22 FAM. L.Q. 1, 9-13 (1988) (outlining different legal
and professional standards to justify reporting of suspected abuse, substantiating com-
plaints and pursuing involuntary intervention; the diversity of state and federal law on
this subject; and the need for "specific operational definitions and decisionmaking cri-
teria.., for each stage of the child protective process").
(ii) Conduct Violative of Standards. Identification of actionable
"professional judgment" failure is a necessity. It is suggested that
failure to investigate claims of repeated harm, failure to take action
and change an at-risk situation in the face of credible corroboration
of claims of danger or harm, and continued utilization of foster par-
ents with known propensities for harm-infliction or inadequate care,
are all situations which, when tied to resulting injury, create a strong
presumption of liability.
(iii) Supervisory Liability. In terms of supervisory liability, cases
have hardly touched this subject in the foster care arena, but the hint
of a duty to train and a duty to correct grossly inadequate resources
already exists.129 These duties are consistent with grounds of section
1983 liability involved in other public protection areas. 130 Surely, an
agency leader or staff supervisor should be held accountable for the
kind of direct knowledge of harm or danger that would render a line
worker liable who, without significant professional justification,
failed to initiate or attempt appropriate corrective action. However,
agency policies which fail to require prompt and diligent action in life
or health threatening situations, or in addressing training gaps on su-
pervision of basic safety and care functions (especially when such re-
sponsibilities are defined or implied by state law), should also support
municipal entity and managerial level responsibility for resulting
harm.
(iv) Official Immunity Problems. Troublesome issues of immunity
lie ahead in the enforcement of the "safe foster care" mandate. Fed-
eral courts, for example, have exhibited no consensus on whether
temporary or emergency actions to take children away from parental
custody are to be treated as subjects of qualified immunity13' or abso-
lute immunity.132 It appears settled that formal child abuse or ne-
glect complaints initiated by welfare agencies pursuant to their
official mission and agency workers who appear as witnesses or pre-
pare and present required reports in child dependency and abuse pro-
ceedings should be entitled to prosecutorial type immunity.
Established precedent has made it clear that neither a crime needs to
129. K.H. v. Morgan, 914 F.2d 846, 854 (7th Cir. 1990) ("The officials responsible for
the inadequacy of resources [for safe foster care placements] might be liable in
damages").
130. See, e.g., City of Canton v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378 (1989) (validating claim of mu-
nicipal liability for failure to provide necessary care while in police custody based on
"grossly inadequate training" of shift commanders where lack of training policy was
attributable to "deliberate indifference").
131. This is analogous to the position of policemen seeking arrest warrants for fel-
ony suspects. See Malley v. Briggs, 475 U.S. 335 (1986) (qualified immunity provides
ample protection for police officer seeking arrest warrants with supporting affidavits).
132. The analogy here would be to prosecutorial proceedings. See Imbler v.
Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409 (1976) (prosecutor acting within scope of duties in pursuing
criminal prosecution enjoys absolute immunity from civil suit for damages).
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be involved nor must the initiator be a prosecutorial officer, narrowly
defined, in such situations. However, given the protective biases of
the "professional judgment" standard, the sphere of absolute immu-
nity for welfare workers and their organizations should not be al-
lowed to extend beyond these situations or otherwise stray from the
general rule for executive officials that "qualified immunity repre-
sents the norm."'1 33
(v) Immunity for Post-Disposition Supervision. A troublesome
immunity issue derives from case law suggestions in one circuit that a
state court proceeding and order granting foster care custody to a
named foster parent cloaks subsequent casework supervision of that
foster parent with absolute immunity.'3 4 Unforeseen post-adjudica-
tion misbehavior of a foster parent hardly seems sufficiently related
or integral to initial judicial placement decisionmaking to warrant a
guaranty of immunity for action or inaction in the face of such devel-
opments which threatens harm to foster children. Qualified immu-
nity will remain available to protect essentially professional handling
of post-disposition developments that affect a foster child's basic well
being which were never presented to a state adjudicative body in
prior removal and placement proceedings.
(vi) Voluntary Custodial Placements. With respect to voluntary
foster care arrangements, it appears that the Supreme Court in
DeShaney has staked its liberty interest desideratum on custody (or
other affirmative action) which impairs the child's ability to protect
or care for itself or obtain such help from parents or others. A "vol-
untarily" placed child within the state foster care system is as depen-
dent on the adequacy of state care, discipline, and protection as the
child committed pursuant to a formal court dispositional order. We
know, moreover, that voluntary commitment can be the functional
equivalent of a "plea bargain" negotiated to avoid the expense and
trauma of a state court neglect or abuse determination. The norm for
"voluntarily" committed children should thus call for the same mea-
sure of protection as that enjoyed by children placed in government
foster care systems via contested court proceedings. There will no
doubt be special fact patterns dictating a different result, but the
weight of past federal court wisdom on this subject 135 hopefully will
remain intact despite some recent suggestions to the contrary.136
133. Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 807 (1982).
134. See Babcock v. Tyler, 884 F.2d 497 (1989), cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 1118 (1990).
135. See supra notes 36-38 and accompanying text.
136. See supra notes 39-40 and accompanying text.
(vii) Private Causes of Action Under Federal Legislation. A defini-
tive pronouncement on section 1983 and private action enforcement
of state foster care obligations under the Adoption Assistance and
Child Welfare Act, as amended, should endorse the generally broad
acceptance of such remedies to date. Recent decisions have scruti-
nized the issues with care and, it is believed, adhere faithfully to
Supreme Court standards concerning when such enforcement is suit-
able and when it may be implied from legislative enactments.13 7
(viii) Non-Custodial Protection. Finally, while it appears clear that
the DeShaney principles leave little room for a "special relationship"
doctrine to trigger liberty interests outside of a custodial context, it
would be unfortunate if the Supreme Court abandoned that notion
entirely in foster care services. The guiding principle of DeShaney is
that when the government, by its own action, places an individual at
hazard and in a situation in which he or she is unable to protect him-
self or herself, affirmative duties of protection can arise. Federal
courts have identified certain situations of this kind not involving
government assumption of custody,138 in which the DeShaney ration-
ale seems to apply. Similar situations are not unimaginable in foster
care administration, and should admit the possibility of due process
protection.1 39
The agenda of constitutional protection issues for children in that
peculiar form of protective custody and shelter known as foster care
is a substantial one, and it demands Supreme Court clarification.
Such assistance will undoubtedly be forthcoming. The Supreme
Court, although at times deliberate in pace, has never shrunk from
its responsibilities in the definition of children's rights. With a sys-
tem under siege, the growing problems of disadvantaged children in
our society, and large populations of our youth being less than opti-
mally served by the nation's child welfare apparatus, it is hoped that
137. See supra notes 114-116 and accompanying text.
138. Wood v. Ostrander, 879 F.2d 583, 589 (9th Cir. 1989) (police indirectly placed
standard car occupant in danger); Cornelius v. Town of Highland Lake, 880 F.2d 348,
356 (11th Cir. 1989) (municipality endangered municipal employee), cert. denied, 110 S.
Ct. 1784 (1990). The Supreme Court itself acknowledged the possibility of an actiona-
ble "special relationship" obligation of protection or warning to endangered citizens by
perpetrators not in state custody. See generally Martinez v. California, 444 U.S. 277,
285 (1980) (dictum in civil rights suit where victim's family sought damages for harm
caused by released felon).
139. The "special relationship" doctrine has been given some post-DeShaney voice
in the foster care areas. See Lipscomb v. Simmons, 884 F.2d 1242, 1246 (9th Cir. 1989)
(in finding a substantive due process violation of family association rights in state de-
nial of foster care support funds for child living with relatives in foster placement, the
court stated "[wihen an individual has a special relationship with the State ... the
state assumes an affirmative obligation to secure that individual's constitutional
liberty").
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such scrutiny will come sooner rather than later. The result cannot
help but clear the air and clarify the duties of governmental service
and justice systems in this important area.

